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1. Introduction
It is widely accepted that investment is one the most important determinants of growth. From
the point of view of economic analysis it is stated that productive investment impacts both the
supply and the demand and contributes to growth and job creation. From the supply side,
investment improves the productive capacity through the acquisition of new equipments that
incorporate technical progress and consequently contribute to the increase in labor
productivity. These productivity gains could then spread to other economic sectors. From the
demand side, investment helps to increase demand for goods and services due to the fact that
the observed productivity gains may lead to prices reduction and wages increase. These two
phenomena lead to an increase of households’ purchasing power and then an increase of
demand. This was the case in Africa in the few past years where growth was mainly driven by
domestic demand (AfDB, OECD, UNDP, 2014)1. Indeed, Africa experienced in recent years,
at the same time an increase in domestic consumption due to high levels of wages and
remittances and high levels of private investment and infrastructure investment. These factors
led to an increase in domestic demand.
Basically investment, that is to say the change in the capital stock between two given dates,
depends on two factors: the cost of capital and market opportunities. The cost of capital as
measured by the interest rate is used to analyze the profitability of investment projects. As for
market opportunities, they respond to the concern that investment decisions are guided by the
possibility of achieving maximum returns from the sales of the company. From a
macroeconomic perspective, gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) is then determined by the
change in aggregate demand and thus by economic growth. Beyond these factors, there are a
multitude of variables that are likely to determine investment decisions. Two types of factors
can be put forward in this regard: the macroeconomic factors and factors related to the
economic environment. Among the macroeconomic factors one can mention the volume of
long-term credit to the economy which is partly determined by the availability of savings, the
volume of public investment and the level of government debt. For factors related to the
economic environment one could retain the Doing Business indicators and governance
indicators (political stability, legal system and corruption in particular).
Africa is one of the world regions whose development potentials are particularly important.
But despite this situation, Africa is one of the continents where poverty exists on a large scale.
More than 44 % of the African population lives below the poverty line. Yet, various forms of
development strategies have been designed and implemented in the African countries. In
1992, in its publication Governance and Development, the World Bank refers to the quality of
government as the cause of the failure of several of these strategies. Attention is henceforth
focused on how governments organize the management of state and govern economic
activities.
The place and the role of institutions in development have been widely discussed in economic
literature. It is commonly accepted that the existence of strong and clear rules is a
fundamental basis for economic activity. In particular, there is an increasingly agreement on
the idea that, in order to stimulate private investment, it is necessary to stabilize the business
environment.
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The aim of this paper is to analyze the relation between governance and investment in Sub
Saharan Africa (SSA). In particular, we study how private investment is affected by
regulatory and judiciary systems, political stability, macroeconomic conditions and
corruption. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview
of Sub-Saharan Africa economic situation. Section 3 provides a brief review of related
literature. Section 4 is dedicated to the presentation of the methodology used in the study.
Section 5 discusses empirical results and section 6 concludes..
2. An overview of SSA macroeconomic and governance context
The African continent has 54 countries with the Sahara desert which separates it in two
different geographical and economic entities, North Africa and the Sub-Saharan Africa.
Sub-Saharan Africa comprises 49 countries with a combined population of 875 millions in
2011. This Sub-Saharan part of Africa globally shares similar characteristics.
At the economic side, Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the less advanced regions. According
to the World Bank, 48.5% of the sub-Saharan population lived on less than $ 1.25 a day in
2010 (World Bank, 2013).2 Issue of development is still on the agenda for this region.
Recent developments of macroeconomic indicators for SSA are favorable. Despite the
effects of the 2008 financial crisis and a slight slowdown in 2013, the World Bank plans
good prospects for the region. Since the mid-1990’s the region have achieved strong and
sustained growth. In 2013, average growth rate in SSA was 5% while growth rates of the
continent as a whole and the global economy were respectively 4% and 3%.
However, this relatively strong growth hides large disparities among countries. First,
growth performance varies widely across countries. From 2006 to 2012 growth was good
enough for some countries while other have experienced difficulties. For example, Burkina
Faso records continuous growth over the period (an average of 5%) and Ghana
experienced accelerated growth. Output growth in this country was continuously
increasing. In contrast, Cote d'Ivoire had known negative growth rate from 2000 to 2004
and in 2011. This recession is mainly due to the crisis experienced by the country during
the period. In 2012, the end of the political crisis marks the return of growth in this country
with a growth rate of 9.5%. The second characteristic of sub-Saharan Africa growth is its
high volatility in some countries. In 2001, the growth rate of Equatorial Guinea amounted
to 63.4%. In 2008 and 2010, the growth rate of this same country was respectively -3% and
-1.7%. The 2001 high growth rate in Equatorial Guinea is mainly due to the discovery and
exploitation of new natural resources. But such volatility is a sign of the shakiness of the
engines of growth. This feature is common to most of countries oil-exporting countries.
During the 2000 decade investment rate had an upward trend in Sub-Saharan Africa. It has
gone from 17% in 1999 to 23% in 2009. Since then, investment to GDP ratio remained
steady with an average rate of 22% on period from 2010 to 2013 (IMF, 2013). The
investment to GDP ratio increased from 17% in 1999 to 22,8% in 2013 (IMF, World
development outlook, April 2013) . The global financial crisis had affected investment in
the region. In 2010 and 2011 the region had experienced a decline of investment rate that
could be attributed to the crisis. Private investment evolution did not display a clear trend.
Private investment rate increased from 21.93% in 2006 to 23% in 2007. From 2008 to
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2010 it declined steadily to 21.39% in 2010 and rose slightly to 22.55% in 2011. Regarding
public investment, the region had experienced an increase in the investment to GDP ratio
from 7.14% in 2006 to 9.5% in 2010 (World Bank, 2012). This rate dropped to 5.56% in
2011. FDI as a percentage of GDP is low for the region. But one should mention that
despite the low levels of FDI to GDP ratio, FDI flows increased considerably during the
period. It was multiplied by four from 2006 to 2011 (IMF, 2013).
The success of any development strategy in Sub-Saharan Africa requires stability, a sound
legal and regulatory framework and good governance. The key risk factor that could hinder
the good performance of the region is its stability (IMF, Regional Economic Outlook, 2013).
Several countries in SSA still face many conflicts and crises. One of four African countries
suffers from the effects of armed conflict, while 20% of Africans live in areas severely
disrupted by conflicts (World Bank, 2011). The risk of conflict is quite high and the area is
also prone to humanitarian crises and terrorist and criminal networks. This means that
economic activities in the region are largely influenced by these conflicts.
Regarding governance, the region has also mixed results. Poor governance and dysfunctional
political institutions had led to the failure of several projects and development programs. SSA
is the region with the lowest performance with respect to the Doing Business indicators. The
countries of the region combine shaky jurisdictions and complex procedures and high costs.
Because of these, the SSA is farthest from the distance to the frontier3. However, the region
has narrowed the gap since the first publication of the DB report and is closest to the frontier.
The region had recorded best performances in terms of improving the business environment.
In addition to individual commitment of States in regulatory reforms, some countries have
decided to get together to pursue this goal. These include the Organization for the
Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA) whose focus is legal framework for the
private sector. OHADA comprises 17 countries and aims at setting judicial integration of
member countries to facilitate trade and investment, ensure legal and judicial security of
business activities and facilitate the resolution of conflicts. Participating in such a group has
the advantage of helping to harmonize national practices and to compel states to implement
common decisions. This suggests that members of an organization have the closest legal
frameworks could present a model of incentives for more dynamic and efficient investment; it
would be interesting to explore such a possibility. This suggests that member countries of
such an organization have common legal frameworks and could present a model of incentives
for more dynamic and efficient investment.
3. A brief review of related literature
Many authors highlighted the importance of institutions based on comparisons of
historically differentiated experiences in some regions. More importantly the difference in
regimes is considered as the main reason behind the development of some regions and not
others. By comparing the legal regimes in force in the seventeenth century across different
parts of the world, North D. and Thomas (1973) explained why the economic take-off
occurred in North-West Europe and not in China -the most advanced nation of that period.
Both authors agree that the explanation clearly lies in the nature of legal regimes that were
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governing these regions. In contrast to China, countries such as England and the
Netherlands had well-defined property rights pushing individuals to entrepreneurism and
innovation for better profits.
In the twentieth century, the world division into two blocs namely the socialist bloc with
planned economy and the liberal block with market economy brought a new focus on the
issues of property rights. According to Hayek the lack of property rights disables prospects
for benefits of officials and thus prevents the emergence of markets. The dislocation of the
socialist bloc in the 1990’s comforted this idea. More specifically, a similar comparison is
made by Acemoglu et al (2004) between both republics of Korea after the division of the
country as a result of World War II. The Republic of Korea supported by the liberal
western block and the People's Democratic Republic to the supported by the communist
Soviet Union. The latter established socialist leanings institutions by removing property
rights and centralizing economic decisions whereas the Republic in the South developed a
market economy with a constitution and institutions providing incentives to the private
sector. Both areas share similar characteristics in terms of cultures, ethnicities and
languages; physical geography and climate were slightly different while initial conditions
in capital stock in infrastructure were in favour of the Republic of Korea. Half a century
after the separation, the national income of the South part was 15 times higher than income
in the North. According to these authors the profound differences in economic institutions
explain these differentiated experiences in terms of economic performance.
In the same vein, De Soto (1989) seeking to identify the reasons for the low growth in Peru
concluded that cumbersome administrative procedures, corruption and the prevalence of
the informal sector are obstacles to economic dynamism. In such a situation, property
rights are uncertain and risky compensation innovative initiatives, according to North. In
2000, De Soto added to his diagnosis that the lack of clearly defined rights complicates the
corporate funding for enterprises.
Recently, several empirical studies were carried out as from the 1990s attempting to
econometrically establish the essential character of the quality of institutions, political
stability and market conditions in the economic growth. We consider the studies of
Gwartney J. et al. (1996) and the studies of LLSV4. Gwartney J. et al. (1996) use data of 96
countries over the period 1975-1995 to study the relationship between freedom and
economic growth. They used 17 variables grouped into four blocks: currency and inflation;
expropriation and discriminatory taxation; restrictions on international trade; and the size
and function of the government. The results indicate that countries with higher freedom
indices systematically have higher growth rates whilst the size of the government inhibits
the growth. In subsequent publications from this study, it comes out that countries with
improved freedom index have experienced stronger growth. In 2008, Gwartney et al.
established a correlation between the value of the index of freedom and EDI.
The findings from the LLSV studies were published in 1998 and 1999 respectively on
corporate funding and the quality of governance. The basic idea of the first study was that
companies cannot get funding or refunding from their creditors and shareholders unless
they have confidence that their rights will be safeguarded by legal systems. They collect
data on joint stock companies and sureties of 49 countries. They then grouped these
countries into four groups of legal families: the Anglo-Saxon common law, civil law
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systems of French and German inspiration and the Scandinavian inspirations system. A
primary result shows that investor protection significantly varies between legal families; it
is stronger in the Anglo-Saxon system and lower in the French-inspired system. The end
result meanwhile states that countries protecting investors have a weaker growth and low
availability of capital. This result is economically plausible because these are investors
responsible for the accumulation of capital, which is essential to the creation of income. In
1999, the ambition of the authors was quite different but still focusing on institutions. They
attempted to verify previous thesis instead of the quality of governance namely through
public sector institutions (bureaucracy, size of the government, corruption, definition and
enforcement of property rights ...) influencing economic growth. After collecting a large
amount of data on the economic, cultural and religious policy variables, they proceeded
with a series of regressions. The authors came to the conclusion that: the quality of
governance is better in rich countries compared to poor countries, the same improvement
was observed in Anglo-Saxon legal system countries compared to legal civil law tradition
countries, and in countries dominated by Protestantism compared to countries dominated
by Catholicism and Islam. In general, they established that the cultural and religious
institutions and context as a whole affect the economic performance and the economic
development, by extension. The LLSV study findings were so successful that the authors
used them to write a thesis entitled Legal Oginis suggesting that legal systems condition
the institutions established and economic outcomes, by extension. Such an argument would
necessarily face critics.
Dam (2006) made a critical review of the vision of the previous results. While accepting
the idea that legal institutions have a critical role in development, the report first points out
the fact that the indices of freedom, functioning and independence of the courts are
difficult to interpret because of their composite construction. It then appears that there are
not differences between legal families for the homelands of these legal traditions. La Porta
al. (2008) explained that such mother countries like France and Belgium implemented
compensation mechanisms that corrected the weaknesses of their legal system. Spaman
also criticizes the LLSV studies 1998 for using many subjective opinions in the
development of some indices. An important point of controversy is highlighted by Rajan
and Zingales (2003) on the development of financial markets. In fact, in 1919, the
development of financial markets was more advanced in France than in the United States
of America. In 1980, there was a reversal of this relation, while from 1999 the financial
development converged in these two countries. That situation qualified as great reversal
challenges the causal role of legal families. Milhaupt and Pistor (2008) examined a series
of crises and connected them with legal families. They concluded that the predictive power
of the theory of legal origins is difficult to establish. What matters to them is much more
the adaptability of systems than the systems themselves. It is clear that the above criticism
does not deny the role of public and legal institutions. There was therefore a global
consensus resulting from the empirical studies and historical analyses. In the early 2000
century more focused studies were conducted on how far the institutions influence the
economic performance.
As early as in the 2000s, research started linking economic performance to business
environment indicators. This was made possible thanks to the DB WB project that
expanded and systematized the work of La Porta et al. (1999) and Djankov et al (2002)
through the publication of quantitative indicators on the environment companies.
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In the article The Regulation of Entry, Siméon Djankov, Raphael La Porta, Florencio
Lopez-De-Silanès and Andrei Scheleifer based on data collected in 85 countries including
seventeen (17) SSA countries, developed indicators related to the cost and the number of
procedures one should go to start a typical business. The aim was to test the theories of
regulation, that to see whether the regulations promote growth and well-being of
consumers. Their results showed that countries with a complex regulation do not generally
have a better quality of products; countries with high costs and complex procedures have a
large informal economy and greater corruption. Conversely, they found that entry
regulations are more transparent in democratic countries and those with a limited size of
the government. The methodology they used to develop the indicators is largely close to
that used by the World Bank to develop the Doing Business indicators.
Djankov et al. (2006) considering these indicators for 135 countries showed the influence
of the business environment reforms on the economic growth. By using the ranking of each
country for the indicators, they developed a composite normalized index between 0 and 1.
They then regressed this index on per capita GDP growth rate by controlling the quality of
governance and macroeconomic variables. The results showed that the DB indicators have
a positive effect on the growth rate. In particular, countries whose indicators are gone from
last to first quartile experienced a rate of 2.3% increase in their growth rate.
Eifert B.P. (2009) also used the DB database from 2003 to 2007 to check the influence of
DB reforms on investment and on the GDP. Analysis of the timing of the quantity of
reform indicates a number of models. Reforms are globally distributed and their impact is
more pronounced in countries with heavy regulations. Macroeconomic characteristics do
not significantly influence the occurrence of reforms. From the overall goal of his study it
clearly comes out that some reforms have a positive impact on the rate of investment and
growth particularly in relatively poor and relatively well-governed countries; the median
reform corresponding to a reduction of the deadlines for business registration by ten days
would result in an increase in the investment rate of 0.27 and 0.15%, respectively.
Kappler L. and I. Love (2001) successfully concluded that reforms promote the creation of
new businesses and the aggregate investment on the World Bank database of 92 countries.
After estimating the simple model, they sought to identify to what threshold countries must
reduce an indicator of regulations of entrepreneurship so as to have the greatest change in
the rate of business creation. They lead to relatively poor countries and relatively wellgoverned having a faster growth of 0.4% and 0.2% respectively after the implementation
of one or several reforms.
Unlike the studies presented above using country aggregated data, there are
microeconomic studies that attempt to assess the impact of regulatory regimes on business
performance. We retain two studies conducted in this line. The first one conducted by
Hallward-Driemeier et al. (2006) focused on Chinese companies. The authors used data
from the the WB5 for 1500 Chinese firms across five cities to measure more accurately the
critical elements of the business environment. In fact, they believe that the overall
environmental indicators such as DB indicators assigning a single score to each country
have limitations insofar as the regulation is not uniform inside large countries such as
China because of the high political and economic decentralization. They perform a series
5
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of regressions of various corporate business performance indicators on the business climate
for each region of the country. Selected performance indicators include: the growth in
sales, employment, the rate of investment and total factor productivity. Their indicators
include regional averages of non-permanent employment rate, access to credit, the
proportion of R&D workers using computers, losses due to power electric load-shedding,
transport or waste of the time dedicated to administrative procedures and corruption scores.
They think that these indicators and property are important for growth, productivity and
business investment. The effect is particularly more remarkable for national and foreign
capital property, the simplicity of regulations, corruption, technological development and
the flexibility of the labour market. Oppositely the effect is less remarkable for improving
access to credit and infrastructure quality.
The second study also covered business and focused on Morocco. Augier and P. (2010) al.
attempted to explain the role of the business environment in the performance of these
companies. They used data from the annual inventories of Moroccan companies (1997 2004) and from the WB. The business environment was captured based on access to credit,
asymmetries in the application fees and the dealing with permits, the constraints related to
administration and starting a business and the quality of infrastructure. Business
performance was captured using the total factor productivity estimated by semi-parametric
methods. The results showed a strong correlation between total factor productivity and
access to credit; tax heterogeneity and the bureaucracy and the asymmetry in the
application of regulations are associated with low productivity.
To capture the impact of regulatory reform on investment, the starting point is the dynamic
model of corporate behaviour. This model is widely described by Eifert (2009). The weight
of the various economic sector regulations and the various stages of the business life had
varied influence on their decision-making including the decision on whether to invest or
not. The effects of regulations on businesses are examined through the changes they bring
on fixed costs and variable costs and the recent adjustment costs of the latter.
Regulations resulting in a change in fixed costs businesses almost exclusively affect the
entry of new firms. When regulations create barriers to entry, they force potential entrants
expecting low productivity to cancel or at least delay their entry. Most of them remain in
the informal sector where regulatory requirements are lower, proportionally to
development opportunities such as access to bank credit. On the other hand, this type of
regulations acts as a filter that excludes low productivity enterprises. They also influence
the degree of competition in the economy, increasing the marginal product of factors for
existing businesses. In this way, this type of regulations has an ambiguous overall effect.
Regulations affecting variable costs increase of enterprises namely production costs of
each unit of product. They thus create a loss for the companies on each product unit sold.
Very logically, they therefore affect the performance of the business they govern. As for
the adjustment costs, they represent the different costs that companies incur as a result of
fluctuations in the production but which are not followed by changes in the factors used
because of the rigidities of the regulation. Such costs create friction depending on the size
of the company.
Ultimately, a decrease in fixed costs incurred by a regulatory reform could more likely result
in facilitating the entry of low productivity anticipating a low level of profit. This could
simplify access of the poor to the formal economy and to better opportunities. However, the
7

regulations that significantly affecting the aggregate economic performance are those
affecting the variable costs and the adjustment costs. However, we paid attention to
regulations affecting business entry. In fact, a reform facilitates the entry of smaller firms but
it facilitates greater productivity companies. Regulation has complex effects on businesses
and the different categories of regulation could be integrated into a dynamic model of firm
behaviour. Considering the enormous complexity of this model, it is possible to specify a
more simple and operational model that captures the impact of the overall regulation on
macroeconomic variables (Eifert, 2009).
4. Methodology
4.1. Variables specification and data sources
In recent studies Doing Business indicators were used to capture the business environment
and its impact on economic performances (Djankov and al, 2006; Klapper and Love, 2010; B.
Eifert, 2009). Other indicators are available for this type of evaluation. But a quick analysis
suggests that the DB indicators are strongly correlated with most other baseline indicators6.
Therefore, this study will use the DB indicators as indicators of the business environment.
Beside the usual DB indicators the new indicator, the distance to the frontier will be used.
Three of the ten categories of indicators will not be considered in this study. The first one is
getting electricity. Data for this area is only available over half of the study period (from
2009). The two other indicators are protecting investors and getting credit. Data for these
categories of indicators do not vary over the period for the countries covered.
For selected categories, preference is given to the time taken, expressed in days, to implement
procedure rather than to the number of procedures. Both indicators contain the same
information but the timeline is a more informative than the number of procedures.
Cost indicators evaluated as a percentage of GDP do not enable to measure the implemented
reforms since their variations are largely influenced by GDP variations. Yet, GDP is widely
volatile for many sub-Saharan African countries. These indicators will not be taken into
account. Such indicators include the cost for starting a business; the cost for dealing with
construction permits, the minimum capital for starting a business as a percentage of GDP. Not
all areas assessed are subject to common practices across all the countries of the region. For
example, countries such as South Africa, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, and Mauritania
(….) do not have practice for three of the four indicators for resolving insolvency regulation.
These three indicators are also discarded from the analysis.
4.1.1. Progress of DB indicators over the period
Data from thirty eight countries are used for the study over the period 2006-2011. During this
period some indicators have been improved to facilitate the business culture. To assess the
evolution of these indicators over the period for the sampled countries, we observed the
progress of three specific values namely, the mean, minimum and maximum of each
indicator. Table 1 displays these figures. Most number of days required to complete
procedures are on average below 100 days, except for dealing with construction permits (over
200 days) and especially for the implementation of contracts which varies very slightly and
6
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remains higher than 600 days over the entire period. The average number of days generally
tends to slightly decrease. Average costs also showed a downward trend, except for costs
relating to trading across-borders (exports and imports) that have an upward trend; there was a
steeper decline in the average cost of dealing with construction permits. The slight change in
the average level of indicators does not mean that these indicators have not improved. In fact,
countries performed different levels of reforms in the areas measured. Some countries
experienced very low progress while others experienced significant improvements. In this
way, improvements in indicators were not sufficient to significantly change the average
levels. For example, for the number of days related to starting a business, Equatorial Guinea
increased only from 137 days to 135 days, while Burkina Faso and Rwanda increased from 40
and 200 days to 14 and 8 days respectively.
Extreme values of the indicators did not significantly vary as well. The minimum level
decreased for nine indicators but stayed unchanged for four indicators in 2006 and 2011; the
minimum level increased for three indicators. Regarding the upper ends, the maximum levels
increased for seven indicators, decreased for eight indicators; remained at the initial level for
only one. Once again, the strong distribution of reforms comes out of this. Reforms in
different fields are distributed across countries and over the period; and the scope of the
reforms is also distributed in space and time.
4.1.2. Correlations between indicators
We started by investigating the existence of a correlation between indicators applied to a same
area (Table 2). A positive correlation could be observed between the indicators for starting a
business, dealing with construction permits, registering property, trading across borders and
paying taxes. The correlation is remarkably high for the time and costs for export and import
(over 50%) as well as for starting a business.
Data displayed show existence of strong correlation between indicators of cross-border trade.
The correlation between the time for export and import is 90% and the one between the costs
of the same indicators is over 91%7. We retain for the estimations indicators related to export.
Following the same logic, for areas showing indicators with a relatively high correlation, we
use a single indicator and show preference to time indicators rather than the costs as they are
expressed in relative values, so that the variations observed can be due to comparable
variables. Conversely, variations deadlines better capture the effects of reforms. Candidate
Business environment indicators are the following:
-

The deadline for starting a business;
The deadline for dealing with construction permits;
The deadline and cost for registering property;
The deadline and cost for enforcing contracts;
The deadline and costs of exportation;
The number of payments and total amount paid for taxes;
The rate of insolvency collection.
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Table 1: Progress of Doing Business indicators in Sub-Saharan Africa

Time for starting a business

Cost for starting a business
Time dealing with construction
permits

Cost for dealing with construction
permits

Time for registering property

Cost for registering property

Number of taxes payments

Total of tax payments

Time for Importation

Cost for Importation

Time for Exportation

2007
13
55
135
6.9
196.1
1314.6
79
219
533
13.4

2008
7
50
135
5.3
191.8
1180.7
79
20
533
16.4

2009
6
44
161
1.7
135.3
935.4
79
224
614
13.1

Max
min
Mean
Max
min
Mean
Max
Min
Mean
Max
min
Mean
Max
min
Mean
Max
Min

2006
13
57
153
8.6
244.4
209.5
79
213
533
14.7
1779.5
7
13205.
2
9
103
397
1.6
11.9
25
8
41
66
15.4
76.5
286.5
13
48
78
683

1612.9
10829.
4
9
92
371
1.7
11.95
27.1
8
40
66
15.4
78.47
292.1
13
47
102
683

1619.6
12219.
7
9
88
371
1.3
11.43
27.9
8
40
66
15
77.5
292.1
13
44
102
673

Mean
Max
min
Mean
Max

2111
5715
13
39
78

2086.5
5715
13
37
78

2112.2
5715
14
36
78

1218
8794.
5 13138
9
9
80
70.4
334
295
0.6
0.5
10.52
9.97
25
20.6
8
8
40
39.7
66
66
15
15
77.3
73.6
292.1 292.1
13
11
42
40
102
100
677
689
2404. 2475.
6
3
6215 6345
14
11
35
34
78
75

min
Mean
Max
min
Mean
Max
Min
Mean
Max
min
Mean

2010
3
42
161
1.4
119.6
847.6
53
205
614
9.4
1318.
3

2011
3
42
161
1.5
93
228.4
75
199
614
10.9
1030
6822.
8
9
65
295
0.4
9
20.6
8
40
64
14.3
73.5
339.1
10
39
101
689
2650.
9
8525
10
32
75
10

min
Costs for exportation

Time for enforcing contracts

Cost for enforcing contracts

Average for resolving insolvency

Mean
Max
min
Mean
Max
Min
Mean
Max
min
Mean
Max

463

624

697

1675.3
4867
276
653
1070
14.3
53.1
151.8
0
17.7
51.8

1679.4
4867
276
656
1280
14.3
52.6
151.8
0
20.1
57.5

1698.4
4867
276
655
1280
14.3
52.6
151.8
0
18.1
57.1

725
1926.
7
5367
276
667
1280
14.3
51.9
151.8
0
18
57.5

737
1988.
5
5497
260
651
1280
14.3
51.9
151.8
0
18.2
57.5

737
2032.
6
5902
230
647
1296
14.3
52.7
151.8
0
19.1
60.8

Table 2: Correlation between indicators of the same area
Correlation8

Indicators
Deadline
Starting a business

Cost
Deadline

Dealing with construction permits

Cost
Deadline

Registering property

Cost
Number of payments

Payment of taxes

global average
Deadline

Enforcing contracts

Cost
Deadline for exportation
Cost for exportation

Trading across-border

Deadline for importation
Cost of importation

Regulation of insolvency recovery rate

0.32

0.15

0.10

0.045

0.074

0.70

0.73

Recovery average

4.1.3. Macroeconomic variables
We consider macroeconomic variables from the database of the World Bank for SSA. These
macroeconomic variables include the variable of interest pertaining to private investment and
variables that explain the level of investment. They also serve as a control variables. The GDP
8

Interrelationship between the indicators of the same category

11

growth rate enables to control the influence of economic cycles. Variables capturing the
quality of the policy environment and governance are also used as controls as agents may
change their investment decisions based on the levels of these indices: Political Rights and
civil Liberties indices of Freedom House and the perception of corruption by Transparency
International.
Private investment is the variable being observed. It is represented by private sector gross
fixed capital formation. We have already mentioned the upward trend between 2006 and 2011
of this variable in the previous section. The theories presented on the relationship between
investment and business environment is reminiscent of a correlation. Yet, there is no prior
indication of such relationship. That is why in the development of private investment we must
get to discard the effects of other variables to only keep those of the business environment.
Macroeconomic variables used as control variables are the following:
-

-

The GDP growth rate: The product level is a key determinant in deciding to invest in
the economic literature: either whether ex-ante in the Keynesian base model and expost in the classic model. In general, it is clear that we decide to invest in order to
achieve production.
The balance of the current account
Domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP
Inflation
Government expenditures as a percentage of GDP
The quality of governance and institutions

Evaluation is done here based on two indices published by Freedom House and Transparency
International for the countries covered. Every year Transparency International publishes an
indicator called Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) based on expert opinion surveys.
Countries are ranked from 0 (high corruption) to 10 (low level of perceived corruption). The
series of this index was created from CPI reports from 2006 to 2011. In general, they indicate
a strong correlation between corruption and poverty. In 2006, only two SSA countries
(Botswana and Mauritius) had an index over 5. In 2011, only Cape Verde and Rwanda were
added to the top half of the index. This reflects a positive trend for the indicator though at a
very moderate pace in the area. Since 1950, Freedom House has been publishing annually
indicators on the state of civil liberties and political rights. Both indices are available on the
website of the institution; vary between 1 and 7. One stands for best performances of rights
and liberties and, 7 stands for the poorest performance. The political rights index considers
three areas: electoral process, political pluralism and participation and functioning of
government. The index of civil liberties includes the following areas: freedom of expression
and belief, freedom of association and organization, law enforcement and personal autonomy
and individual liberties. We found a strong correlation between these two indices (around
90%), which led us to consider that the index of civil liberties in the estimate.
4.2.The model
There are various models used to investigate the relation between regulation and economic
performance at the level of firms or countries depending on the nature of the data used.
Djankov et al. (2006) studied correlations between regulation indicators and economic
performance of firms using cross-sectional data. The model used is as follows:
  ′    where  measures economic performance and  measures regulatory
indicators and control variables.
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However, the hypothesis of identification   |  0 indicating that there are no omitted
variables that affect the economic performance and are correlated with indicators and
variables of control seem to be strong enough. An improved version of this model is proposed
by Rajan and Zingales (1998) using also cross-sectional data but taking the explanatory
variables in double differences. This way of doing captures changes in the economic
performance affected by changes in the regulatory environment. The first advantage of this
model is that it addresses the issue of omitted variables. However, it shares the common
limitation characterizing cross-sectional data models: non-inclusion of individual-specific
structural differences on the dependent variable.
The basic model used in this study is similar to that of Eifert (2009). Panel data procedure will
be performed. The model is as follows:
  ′       
under the hypothesis   | ;  ,  implying that the errors are not correlated with
indicators given the  individual effects and  temporal effects.
This model is advantageous for many reasons. Above all, it addresses the issue of omitted
variables constant over time. In addition, it helps control the country-specific trends. These
two points are important for our subject because the regulatory framework is often heavily
influenced by national or sub-regional policies such as employment promotion policies often
through the provision of loan facility.
The model used for the estimation is as follows:
  ′          ! "  # 
&  $% ' ()*  + ")  , "      

$%



Where  is a vector of business environment indicators for the country - in year . ;
 , stands for private investment as a percentage of GDP for country - in year . ;
 is GDP annual growth rate of country - in year . ;
  , stands for Government expenditures as a percentage of GDP for country - in
year . ;
" is Domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP for country - in
year . ;
" The balance of the current account as a percentage of GDP for country - in year . ;


$%


;

(it-1) the rate of GDP growth for country i lagged for one period;
$%

(it-1) private investment as a percentage of GDP, lagged for country - in year .

()* The inflation rate for country - in year . ;
") et " index of civil liberties and the index of perception of corruption for country in year . ;
 Specific timeless effect for country ;
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 The temporal effect common in all countries;
 The error term.
The hypothesis of identification supposes that the errors are not correlated with
macroeconomic and control indicators and variables. Adding lagged dependent variable to the
regressor responds to the need to consider the dynamics of investment. Like most
macroeconomic variables, investment is dependent on cyclical developments; hence the level
of investment in a given year may correlate with the previous investment levels. Furthermore,
the presence of this lagged variable makes our model a dynamic panel model. Assessing such
a model requires specific procedures.
4.3. The procedure for assessment
Two models are implemented depending on the on the nature of indicators used: the first
(Model I) uses the common DB indicators while the second one (Model II) uses the indicators
of distance to the frontier. These two models are estimated for the entire sample. In the
investment equation, the lagged investment appears as an explanatory variable; so we are in
the presence of a dynamic panel. In addition, the time dimension of our panel is relatively
reduced compared to the number of individuals. For this, we use the Generalized Method of
Moments (GMM) system developed by Blundell and Bond (1998), which is suitable for
estimating panel whose temporal dimension is reduced according to Rodman, (2006). The
author shows the weakness of the other estimators compares to the benefits of the GMM
estimator in situations similar to ours.
The GMM estimator is based on the orthogonality conditions between the lagged variables
and the error term. The first GMM estimator is the one with first difference developed by
Arellano and Bond (1991). It also takes the first difference of the original model, which
eliminates the individual effects. The values of the endogenous variables lagged one period or
more are increasingly integrated as tools. The estimation is done in two steps. However, this
estimator has a limitation as it does not take the effect of factors invariant over time into
account. Thus, small samples lead to biased results. To fill the gap of the dynamic panel
estimator by Arellano and Bond, Blundell and Bond (1998) developed the GMM estimator
system. It combines the in level and first difference equations, hence the characterization as
system. The level equation uses different tools from the difference equation. In our case, we
use the one-step GMM estimator system of Blundell and Bond. We introduce the following
tools: the lagged two periods to take investment adjustments into account.
5. Empirical results
5.1. Diagnostic tests
Before performing the panel procedure and the GMM procedure, a number of tests are
required. It is essential perform a specification test in order to check whether the data
available match with the panel model. When considering panel data, the first step is to check
the requirement of homogeneous or heterogeneous data generating process (Hurlin, 2006).
This consists in checking in the econometric model envisioned whether the coefficients are
the same for all countries. The over identification and error auto-correlation test should be
also performed to check for the validity of the tools used. These tests were performed. The
results are shown in Table 3 and Table 4. Data in table 3 indicate that the values of Fisher
statistic do not enable to accept the null hypothesis of no individual effects. The equation with
14

individual effects defined above is therefore assumed. The statistic of autocorrelation error
tested by the Arellano and Bond method indicates that only errors are auto-correlated at order
1 but not at order 2 (Table 4). The Hansen-Sargan statistics for the GMM estimated models
have critical values higher than 10% (Table 4). We therefore cannot reject the null hypothesis
of validity of the tools.
Table 3: Results of the specification test
SSA
Model I

Model II

Fischer

10.19

8.85

P-Value

0.000

0.000

Table 4: Results of autocorrelation and over-identification test
ASS
AR(1)
AR(2)
Hansen

Modèle I
-1,89
(0,059)
-0,344
(0,731)
32,71
(0,307)

Modèle II
-1,76
(0,079)
-0,64
(0,522)
21,81
(0,410)

5.2. Results and interpretation
Ten (10) out of the eleven (11) indicators that were measured are expected to be negatively
correlated to investment. Only the recovery rate is supposed to positively influence
investment rate in case of insolvency.
The results of the estimations are reported in Tables 5 for Model I and Table 6 for Model II.
For Model I, only three indicators have the expected signs: the deadline for starting a
business, the deadline for registering property and the cost for enforcing contracts. The
deadline for starting a business is not significant while the deadline for registering property
and the cost for enforcing contracts are significant at the 5% and 1% significant level
respectively. Empirical evidence enables us to assert a positive effect of these two indicators
on private investment. More specifically, based on our results, reducing the deadline by 10
days for registering property generates an increase in investment up to 0.16% of GDP.
Likewise, a10%, decrease in the cost that enterprises incur to enforce contracts leads to a
higher investment rate of 0, 32 points.
These results are particularly interesting regarding the effects of the business environment on
investment. However, it should be underlined that we get only two significant indicators and
many do not have the expected sign. Eifert B. (2009) also obtained mixed results in the
estimate of the investment function: all the coefficients of the indicators had the expected
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signs but none were significant. One reason for this may be of practical order. Even though
the indicators potentially influence investment decisions, it is possible that investors do not
attach the same importance to all indicators as well. This is plausible to the extent that the
measured data do not affect businesses to the same magnitude. Large investors would give
great importance to enforcing contracts as they are frequently involved in larger contracts,
while small investors would closely look at the procedures and entry costs. Another
interesting fact regarding the deadline for starting a business is the following one: while this is
the area most frequently cited in the reforms, it is not significant in any estimation as in Eifert
(2009). Without being able to give an exact explanation of this result, this could be linked to
the fact that although investors attach importance to the procedures of entry, they care about
challenges encountered in carrying out their activities.
Moreover, it should be reminded that the DB indicators measure the de jure regulations, while
there are practices overriding these legal arrangements. The facto regulations including
corruption and the payment of bribes, could therefore replace the regulation captured by
indicators. We should then moderate the expected influence of these indicators on investment.
According to Eifert (2009) there is a clear need to consider whether the reforms captured by
indicators have an impact, because of the irregularities and the non-enforcement; This
particularly makes sense for developing countries.
Table 6 presents the estimation results of Model II. Six out of the eight indicators of distance
to the frontier have the expected sign: dealing with construction permits, registering property,
getting credit, paying taxes, resolving insolvency and trading across borders. Dealing with
construction permits, registering property and the payment of taxes are as high as 1%. These
results show that increase for a relative distance of a country compared to best practices in
dealing with construction permits, registering property and the payment of taxes, this
generates a decline in the investment. This could be explained by the fact that investors or
appreciate based on the location of investment firms: they seek the best return for their money
and are encouraged to select countries where regulations are relatively flexible, simpler, and
less expensive . The implications of this finding are important. Indeed, countries wishing to
attract investment must work to bring best practices in terms of regulations because arbitration
can be done on the target invest countries as a result of capital mobility.
Table 5: Estimate results of Model I for SSA
Field

Indicators

Estimated coefficient

Capital gain

Starting a business

Deadline

-0.001384

0.853

Dealing with
construction permits

Deadline

0.0047463***

0.081

Deadline

-0.0155097**

0.038

Cost

0.083596

0.332

Number of payments

0.0781372***

0.051

Global rate

0.0114703**

0.012

Deadline

0.0363033

0.184

Cost

0.000467

0.338

Registering property

Payment of taxes

Exportation
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Deadline

0.0043659*

0.000

Enforcing contracts

Resolving insolvency

Cost

-0.0323676*

0.004

Recovery rate

-0.0683689**

0.022

Table 6: Estimate results of Model II for SSA
Indicators

Estimated coefficient

Starting a business

Capital gain

0.0936672*

0.000

Dealing with construction permits

-0.0839274*

0.000

Registering property

-0.0568171*

0.000

-0.0123015

0.734

-0.0850154*

0.000

Trade across borders

-0.0017965

0.925

Enforcing contracts

0.0454649

0.178

-0.0284549

0.318

Getting credit
Payment of taxes

Resolving Insolvency

6. Conclusion and policy implication
This study aimed at determining the causal relationship between business environment and
economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa. The World Bank doing Business indicators
along with other macroeconomic variable were used to perform a panel analysis using a
GMM procedure. The results of the estimations show that the time taken for registering
property and the cost and time of transfer of ownership have a significant impact on private
investment. The results indicate also that region were able to narrow the distance to the
frontier with construction permits, registering property, getting credit, paying taxes, resolving
insolvency and trading across borders. From a policy point of view, the study highlighted the
fact that SSA countries must continue the reform undertaken so as to reduce the burden of
regulations on businesses. Along with implementing actions to foster the effect of good
business practices, corruption and bureaucracy should be tackled to reduce the gap between
rules and practices. Third, the DB indicators to be more useful to investors should pay
attention to the countries realities and particularities; these are the real facts that need to be
considered because there are the ones that actually affect investors
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